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Abstract
Background: This paper is an edited version of an invited paper submitted to the Australian
Health Care Summit on 17–19 August 2003. It comments upon the policies which have dominated
recent debate and contrasts their importance with the importance of five issues which have
received relatively little attention.
Methods: Policy is usually a response to identified problems and the paper examines the nature
and size of the problems which heave led to recent policy initiatives. These are contrasted with the
magnitude and potential cost effectiveness policies to address the problems in five areas of
comparative neglect.
Results: It is argued that recent and proposed changes to the financing and delivery of health
services in Australia have focused upon issues of relatively minor significance while failing to address
adequately major inequities and system deficiencies.
Conclusion: There is a need for an independent review of the health system with the terms of
reference focusing attention upon large system-wide failures.
1 Introduction
The theme of this paper is that recent and proposed
changes to the financing and delivery of health services in
Australia have focused upon issues of relatively minor sig-
nificance while failing to address adequately major ineq-
uities and system deficiencies. An intriguing question –
not discussed in the paper – is how such drastic failures
could continue year after year with little comment and no
decisive policy commensurate with the magnitude of the
problems. The political-sociological answer to this ques-
tion is undoubtedly complex and contentious. The failure
may (or may not) be attributed to understandable, even
unavoidable obstacles arising from Australia's social his-
tory. Nevertheless it is important to be aware that these
failures exist.
The current state of our health services could justifiably be
described as a 'silent crisis'; service delivery is highly ineq-
uitable and inefficient; patients are dying unnecessarily
and avoidable medical errors are imposing huge financial
and human costs on the community. While this occurs,
health policy at the political level has focussed upon cost
shifting between the States and Commonwealth, between
public and private sectors and between the well off and
the poorer members of society. Reforms addressing the
larger issue have progressed at glacial speed, relative to
what is achievable, or they have stalled altogether.
In Section 2 there is a brief overview of the economists'
analytical framework in order to introduce two prelimi-
nary issues, viz, the role of social values in health system
reform and the constraints created by the limited
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availability of resources. Two commonly made but wrong
inferences from this latter constraint are discussed. Sec-
tion 3 is concerned with recent policy and, in particular,
the changes to private health insurance (PHI) which have
been introduced since July 1997. In contrast with the rela-
tively inconsequential (and possibly negative) impact of
these policies, five major problems are outlined in Section
4, each of which has received insufficient or no attention.
Policy implications and options for future policy are dis-
cussed and highlighted throughout the paper. In the final
section I argue that the optimal health system – entirely
public, largely private or one of the myriad combinations
between these polar options – is the system which is most
likely to address systemic failures. The most important
changes to achieve the optimal system may have less to do
with the public-private mix of services, or even funding,
than with the extent to which these failures are addressed
within any of the conceivable health systems of the future.
This, in turn, may depend upon the willingness to create
appropriate economic and other incentives.
2 Resources, values and the economic 
framework
The discipline of economics provides a framework for the
analysis of options which is based upon a comparison of
costs and benefits. If social welfare is to be maximised
then the logic of the framework must be adopted explic-
itly or implicitly. The framework focuses attention upon
the benefits which might be obtained when resources are
used in a particular way, and the benefits which might
have been obtained if they had been used somewhere else
– the (opportunity) cost of using those resources in the
chosen way. Social wellbeing is maximised when the ben-
efits exceed the (opportunity) costs in every setting and on
every margin where choice is possible.
While this statement is tautologically true, the focus upon
choice highlights two important facts. First, choices gener-
ally do exist; the economy is flexible and choices are
driven by individual and social preferences. Technical
inevitabilities are rarely encountered. Second, and more
fundamentally, it is necessary to define 'benefits'. In prin-
ciple, the abstract framework is consistent with an almost
unlimited number of value systems. For example, in the
context of an intensive care department with limited
capacity, benefits and costs might be measured by lives
saved and lives lost. In this simple example the cost bene-
fit formula would translate into a policy of providing ICU
beds to those most likely to live.
Social objectives in the health sector are clearly more com-
plex than in most other settings and the nexus between
objectives, policies and the optimal health system is more
problematical. Nevertheless, an important conclusion
from this framework (which needs constant repetition) is
that there is not a single 'best' health system; rather, there
are various options which are more or less consistent with
different social goals.
This conclusion is illustrated in Table 1 using two highly
simplified but archetypal social objectives, viz, the egali-
tarian desire for equal access to health or health services
and the social objective of maximising individual choice.
As shown, the first of these objectives is more easily
achieved through a compulsory public system with
defined benefits and constrained choice. The second
objective is most likely to be achieved in a less constrained
and more competitive private system which responds to
individual preferences, as described and generally pre-
scribed by economic theory for less complex markets and
social objectives.
Conclusion 1:The form of the optimal health scheme depends
upon social objectives and disagreement about these translates
into differences with respect to the funding and delivery of
health services.
While the two objectives in Table 1 are archetypes, they
broadly correspond with two important but conflicting
'world views'; that is, with different ethical beliefs about
the appropriate supply and financing of health services.
The social values underpinning the competitive market
model are well articulated and well labelled. Its 'liberal' or
'libertarian' value system emphasises the importance of
individual responsibility and freedom of choice. It is the
prevailing value system in many aspects of life in a
democratic society and there is commonly a presumption
Table 1: The relationship between choice, values and the optimal health system
Objectives/Social Values Option which maximises likelihood of success
Equalise access, outcome Universal (monopoly) Public Insurance/Financing
Maximise choice; diversity + safety net
Optimise the max of these 2 objectives
Pure private (competitive) scheme
Both of the above Mixed public-private schemeAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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that, in the absence of some compelling argument, liberty
and choice should be maximised. In economic theory this
objective is equivalent to the goal of maximising 'utility'
and the Welfarist theory of 'Social Welfare'. Even those
expounding liberal values, however, generally believe that
some constraint upon choice, in the form of compulsory
taxation, is justifiable to finance a limited number of pub-
lic goods and that at least basic medical services should be
provided for the medically and financially indigent. With
this 'world view' fairness generally equates with a vertical
redistribution of income to help the most needy.
In contrast, the value system underpinning the public
model is less clearly articulated (at least in Anglo Saxon
countries). The financing and provision of services to the
entire population is often characterised as 'middle (and
upper) class welfare' and contrasted with the less intrusive
'safety net welfare' which is all that is required to help
those who cannot help themselves. This interpretation of
egalitarianism does not, however, correctly represent the
values which underpin the public health insurance sys-
tem. These are nicely described in a report of a commis-
sion of enquiry into Canadian Medicare as follows:
'Canadian Medicare is far more than just an administra-
tive mechanism for paying medical bills. It is widely
regarded as an important symbol of community, a con-
crete representation of mutual support and concern... it
expresses the fundamental equality of Canadian citizens
in the face of death and disease... as the Premier of Ottawa
pointed out... "There is no social program that we have
that more defines Canadianism"' [1].
The social value or world view embodied in this quotation
does not correspond with the simple notion of assistance
for the indigent. Rather it corresponds with a desire to
'remove health and health care from the economic reward
system' in the same way as all citizens are, in principle,
given equal protection by the law. A close analogy is the
desire to have public parks which may be accessed by all
members of the community without payment. The objec-
tive is not a redistribution of income or the provision of a
safety net. Rather, with this view, access to public parks is
one of the consequences of belonging to the community;
it is a shared benefit and, as such, engenders a feeling of
sharing, participation and belonging. The concept is
closely linked to the notion of 'social capital' which 'accu-
mulates' with an increase in communal sharing and par-
ticipation. Pay parks are possible, but a fully informed
community might reject this option. Its citizens may wish
to live in a community where the Arts flourish, where its
sportsmen and women are a source of national pride,
where parks are free for all citizens, where an acceptable
standard of living is guaranteed after retirement and
where all citizens have access to the same range of medical
services. In European countries the term 'solidarity' is used
to describe this value system. Unfortunately, in English,
there is no commonly used and understood word for the
concept. ('Communitarianism' is the closest translation.)
The consequence of this is a degree of confusion in the
expression of social values as both sides of the debate
attempt to appropriate the word 'equity' to support their
world view. It is clearly desirable that the debate should
not be derailed by linguistic ambiguities.
Conclusion 2:Health policy should be informed by a careful
evaluation of the social values held by different groups of the
community with respect to different elements of the health
system.
While it is ultimately the responsibility of the government
to decide which of these values should be embodied in
policy, it is desirable for the government's decision to be
informed by evidence concerning the community's values
and the strength of preferences for different values systems
by different groups in the community. In his influential
book 'The Power of Public Ideas' Robert Reich emphasises
the importance of 'discovery', or the process of getting the
public to articulate these values [2]. To date, neither this
nor research into health related social values has been car-
ried out satisfactorily in Australia.
Conclusion 3:The choice between public and private funding of
health services depends upon social values and, in particular,
the strength of liberal-libertarian versus solidarity-communitar-
ian values as they apply to the health sector.
Returning to the first defining characteristic of the eco-
nomic framework, the emphasis upon choice conflicts
with two commonly held technocratic beliefs about the
inevitability of particular 'problems'. First, the common
perception that the country cannot, or shortly will not be
able to afford health services is unambiguously false, at
least in the foreseeable future. In the USA, per capita
expenditures are about double the Australian level and the
US Health Care Financing Agency (HCFA) has projected a
doubling of these expenditures relative to GDP by 2030.
This is technically possible. The relevant question is
whether or not we obtain commensurate benefits from
these expenditures and if, as a society, we chose these ben-
efits in preference to the benefits foregone. Taking an
extreme example, if Australians could spend 25 percent of
GDP upon health services this option would probably be
embraced enthusiastically if it resulted in an illness free
life expectancy of 120. Optimal expenditures are entirely
a function of the benefits we obtain and are not driven by
technological imperatives.
Conclusion 4:There is no immediate limit to the optimal level
of health expenditures. It is technically possible to increaseAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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present expenditures very significantly. The optimal level
depends upon the costs and benefits of the various health serv-
ices. Increased health expenditures should be enthusiastically
embraced if they improve health and health related objectives
sufficiently. Technocratic arguments asserting the economic
impossibility of increased health spending or increased public
funding are unambiguously wrong. At best they are based upon
unstated political/ideological assumptions and not economic
arguments.
A similar argument applies to the second non-problem –
the impossibility of funding health services through pub-
lic taxation. Arguments of the form 'the Government can't
afford to pay' are also unambiguously false. The country
which can afford to finance health expenditure from pri-
vate health insurance can also afford to pay an equivalent
amount through taxation and some have argued that PHI
is, itself, a form of privatised tax. The government share of
the health bill is smaller in Australia than in most devel-
oped countries. Likewise, taxation is relatively low. This
implies that Australia could significantly raise its level of
public funding without exceeding the tax burden which is
presently experienced in most comparable countries.
More fundamentally, however, the form of financing for
health services is flexible and is again a matter of social
choice. It is likely that this choice will be influenced by the
relative costs and benefits arising from the choice, but in
the health sector the known costs and benefits associated
with public and private health care are not compelling.
Privately funded health care is often a little more expen-
sive, but countries with a strong preference for liberal-lib-
ertarian values might sensibly opt for a relatively larger
private scheme even if it is more expensive. The principle
of paying more for what is wanted should not be
controversial!
Conclusion 5:The balance between public and private sources
of revenue for a health service should be determined premanu-
ally by the social philosophy of the country. There are no com-
pelling technical or economic constraints on the freedom of
sound choice.
3 Recent policy issues
Public debate has recently focused upon three 'problems',
namely the high and rising cost of pharmaceuticals, the
declining rate of bulk billing by General Practitioners
(and particularly amongst health care card holders) and
the declining number of people purchasing private health
insurance. The comments below do not purport to be an
exhaustive analysis of these subjects but are included to
contrast the subject matter of the policy debate with the
more substantive problems which will be discussed in the
following section. Pharmaceuticals and PHI are discussed
more fully in Richardson and Segal [3].
Pharmaceuticals
Pharmaceuticals are included in the Pharmaceutical Ben-
efits Scheme (PBS) after a detailed review of their effec-
tiveness and cost effectiveness (see Salkeld et al 1998 for a
description [4]). This process does not, by itself, reduce
expenditures. Rather, it ensures that drugs whose effective-
ness is low in relation to their cost will not be adopted.
Expenditures will be lower if the manufacturers of rela-
tively cost ineffective drugs reduce their prices to increase
the likelihood of their inclusion in the PBS. However, this
may be offset (more or less) if drug companies increase
the price of new highly cost effective drugs as they know
that the PBAC is aware of their cost effectiveness. Cost
effective drugs may also be overused if doctors prescribe
them for purposes or at thresholds not tested before their
introduction. Partly for this reason the PBAC has some-
times negotiated a price-volume trade-off – if drug use
exceeds the initial expectation then the agreed price is
lowered.
These measures have not contained pharmaceutical costs.
In view of rising drug prices in other countries it is likely
that this is primarily or entirely attributable to the high
cost of new generation drugs and is not attributable to
policy. Nevertheless, expenditures have risen and in recent
years copayments have been progressively increased in
order to reduce government expenditures through the
PBS. However it is not clear that the use of copayments,
and particularly in a single sector, will have an overall
beneficial effect. First, as demonstrated by the Rand Exper-
iment copayments reduce demand somewhat (elasticities
are low but not insignificant) [5]. There is a dispropor-
tionate effect upon low income households [6] which, in
this case, implies low income non health care card hold-
ers. There is little evidence that lower income patients will
discriminate between effective and less effective drugs and
at least one study suggests that, perversely, the greatest
impact will be upon life saving drugs which have a rela-
tively small immediate impact upon symptoms [4,7].
Secondly, relatively larger copayments in one sub-sector
violates a fundamental principle for achieving allocative
efficiency; viz, a 'level (financial) playing field' between
alternative products/interventions. Violation of this con-
dition increases the likelihood that less cost effective serv-
ices may be used because of the distorted price signals.
Allocative efficiency depends upon relative prices rather
than the existence of copayments per se. More specifically,
high pharmaceutical prices at the point of service will
encourage the use of potentially more expensive interven-
tions including hospital services if a copayment results in
the deterioration of a patient's health.
Thirdly, the effects of copayments on national health
expenditures will be relatively small. Wealthy individualsAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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will simply pay the copayment and health care card hold-
ers will be largely shielded from them. The most impor-
tant effect of the copayment is that it will shift costs from
the taxpayer to the patient; that is, its major effect will be
upon the distribution of income with the healthy-wealthy
taxpayer gaining at the expense of the less healthy-less
wealthy.
In 1960, pharmaceutical costs represented an estimated
22.3 percent of health expenditure. By 2002 they were
13.5 percent of the total. The comparison indicates that
the composition of expenditures may vary significantly
through time and, taken out of context, focus upon a sin-
gle sub-sector may be misleading. Cost control requires a
full system perspective and there is no optimal level of
pharmaceutical expenditures which is independent of the
cost of alternative services. The problem is, in part, attrib-
utable to the program structure of delivery and financing
which treats pharmaceuticals as an independent program
as distinct from an input into an overall treatment regime.
Conclusion 6:Reliance on copayments for the control of phar-
maceutical expenditures is probably an inappropriate policy as
it violates an important principle for achieving allocative effi-
ciency. A more global approach to health policy analysis and
reform is needed.
Bulk billing
Since the introduction of Medicare the percentage of GP
attendances bulk billed rose from 52.5 percent in 1984/85
to a maximum of 80.6 percent in 1996/97, then fell to a
low of 66.5 percent in December 2004. The measures dis-
cussed below appear to have arrested this trend and by
March 2004 bulk billing had risen to 68.7 percent of GP
attendances [8].
The chief problem the reforms were designed to overcome
was the possibility that the falling level of bulk billing
may have jeopardised access to health services by pen-
sioner/health care card holders and other low income
households. Importantly, data did not exist to demon-
strate that this was, indeed, a problem and that bulk bill-
ing or service use by this group had declined by the
average or near average percentage. That is, the existence
and quantitative significance of the 'problem' were not
documented.
The recent 'Medicare Plus' package introduced a poten-
tially important structural change. Rebates for bulk billed/
health care card holders were separated from the rebate to
the general public thereby allowing the separate treatment
of the two groups. To encourage the bulk billing of the
first group the benefit was increased and bulk billing doc-
tors were permitted, for the first time, to direct-bill the
Health Insurance Commission for general patients while
simultaneously charging an 'over the counter' extra pay-
ment, a measure widely perceived as encouraging an
increase in fees as patients will commonly equate the rel-
atively small copayment with the total fee.
These measures have two important effects. First, the
probable increase in general fees allows the benefit paya-
ble for GP bulk billed pensioners/health care card holders
to be at a lower level than would occur than without the
effective cross subsidy from increased general fees. Sec-
ondly, the government can preserve 'equity' (ie bulk bill-
ing the needy) by adjusting only the pensioner/health
care card holder benefit, while simultaneously allowing a
deterioration of the general rebate. Cost shifting would
have been further facilitated by an earlier agreement to
allow private health insurers to reimburse medical
expenses above the schedule fee as part of an agreement
with doctors to remove out-of-pocket costs. But this pro-
posal was rejected by the Senate.
In sum, there is now a structure which facilitates cost shift-
ing from the public to the private sector. There are two
important caveats to this conclusion. First, a rebate struc-
ture which facilities additional cost shifting does not
imply that government will use this option in the short or
long run. Secondly, the effect of additional cost shifting
will be mitigated by an additional element of the Medi-
care Plus package, namely, the introduction of a 'safety
net' which reimburses 80 percent of out-of-pocket, out-of-
hospital costs including billing above the schedule fee
once family expenses reach $1,000 (or $500 for a health
care card holder's family). The long run effect of this latter
cost off-set is difficult to assess. As reported in the
announcement of Medicare Plus the expected cost of the
safety net in its first three years would average $89 million
p.a. as compared with likely out of pocket medical
expenses of about $1,400 million. in 2004/05 (extrapo-
lated AIHW) [9]. Even allowing for a probable cost over-
run the amount is not large. Nevertheless, the 'safety net'
offers additional protection to those who would be most
affected by additional cost shifting; that is, this policy also
helps create a structure where equity, defined in terms of
need, may be reconciled with increased cost shifting.
However, the most significant feature of these changes to
the reimbursement formula for medical expenses is that
they deal with relatively 'small order' issues.
Under Medicare, pensioners/health care card holders with
significant health problems have access to emergency and
outpatient facilities at public hospitals. Poor access to
these will increase inconvenience and queuing and, in an
unknown number of cases, result in poorer health. But
this more serious outcome is likely to be relatively infre-
quent as the majority of this group have always been bulkAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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billed while others will have satisfactory access to hospital
based care.
Conclusion 7:Proposed and actual policies towards pharma-
ceutical expenditures and bulk billing have had a common ele-
ment. Both represent immediate or potential cost shifting from
the government to the public and any net reduction in societal
expenditure because of a reduction in patient initiated services
will have potentially adverse effects upon the health of the 'near
poor'. However, the financial effects of the policies are relatively
small and the indirect adverse effect upon health is likely to be
correspondingly small.
Private health insurance (PHI)
The role and regulation of PHI after the introduction of
compulsory national health insurance has been ambigu-
ous and anomalous. Since Medicare was introduced as the
vehicle for achieving fairness in the financing and delivery
of health care it has never been clearly stated why PHI
should be closely regulated to achieve fairness in he sub-
group of the population which elects to purchase PHI and
why it is regulated in a way which inhibits effective com-
petition. But these are the effects of Australia's community
rating and reinsurance requirements respectively.
In the last one and a half decades there has been an ongo-
ing concern that declining levels of private health insur-
ance have had an adverse effect upon the public hospital
system and that 'PHI reform' has been needed to solve this
problem. The argument is summarised in the following
(constructed) quotation:
'Private health insurance was caught up in a downward
spiral caused by the adverse selection identified in the Pro-
ductivity Commission report [10]. 'Rising premiums trig-
gered by increasing costs induced low risk members to
withdraw. Without their cross subsidy of high cost mem-
bers, premiums were forced to rise again, which further
increased premiums, which induced further departures,
etc.
"PHI is primarily purchased to cover the costs of private hospi-
talisation. Consequently, as PHI declined through time, fewer
patients have been able to afford the cost of private hospitals,
and this has created an excess demand for public hospital beds.
The increasing length of queues is a confirmation of this
problem".
While plausible, the account of history in the second half
of this argument is wrong. Between 1985/86 and 1999/00
private hospitals increased their share of admissions by
32.4 percent from 25.9 to 34.3 percent of the total. The
share of bed days rose from 21.9 to 28.1 percent of the
total or by 28.3 percent [3]. These simple and readily
available statistics unambiguously contradict the conven-
tional wisdom propagated by the media and some politi-
cians. It is true that queues in public hospitals have
increased, but this is attributable to the increasingly dra-
conian budget caps upon public hospitals throughout the
1990s. That is, queuing in the public sector has been pri-
marily a result of supply side and not demand side factors.
(Excess demand for beds cannot explain the closure of
wards that occurred in many public hospitals!) The sim-
plicity of the statistics contradicting the conventional wis-
dom calls into question the analytical capacity of many
media commentators (and some independent
commentators)!
Conclusion 8:Media analysis of the relationship between PHI
and queuing in the public system highlights an important sys-
tem failure; viz, the failure of the media to exercise rudimentary
critical skills in their analysis of PHI and hospital queuing.
Even if PHI membership had fallen sufficiently to have
reduced the share of private hospital admissions by
almost a third, the balance of public and private hospital
separations in 1999/00 would have been similar to the
share in 1985/86. This suggests that it was the events sum-
marised in the first half of the quotation which were of
concern at the government and departmental level and
that PHI membership and the public-private mix of
health financing and delivery were explicitly or implicitly
the real target of health policy.
In response to the 'problem' of falling PHI and the
demand side problem for public hospitals (which did not
exist!), the government introduced three enduring policy
changes. In July 1997 individuals with an income above
$50,000 and families with a combined income above
$100,000 who did not purchase PHI became liable for a 1
percent tax surcharge upon their incomes. In December
1998 a 30 percent rebate on PHI premiums was intro-
duced. (In August 2004 a selective increase in the rebate
was foreshadowed); and in September 1999 lifetime com-
munity rating was enacted which has the effect of reduc-
ing future premiums for those who have held PHI from
the age of 30. Discounts apply at any age between 30 and
64; 30 is the age of maximum discount. Failure to enrol by
this age will result in a higher premium if PHI is subse-
quently purchased.
The evidence demonstrates that these policies, and partic-
ularly the last policy, have succeeded in increasing PHI
membership. However it has created an industry which,
along with the platypus and echidna could be Australia's
entrants into the world's strange but true contest. Australia
would almost certainly win – even without our egg laying
marsupials. First, the surcharge results in a negative price
for the wealthy. Individuals and families above the
income threshold avoid an increasingly large tax paymentAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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as their income rises; that is, if they purchase PHI they will
have a greater income at the end of the year than the indi-
viduals and families above the threshold who do not buy
PHI. This is analogous to supporting the automobile
industry by placing a surcharge on wealthy families who
fail to buy an Australian car. It would be difficult to find
any other support scheme which uses the income tax sys-
tem to coerce the purchase of a particular product. It
would be equally difficult to find a produce where the
price is negative.
Secondly, (and predating the recent legislation) the use of
PHI to cover hospital bills generally results in a greater,
not smaller, out of pocket expense. Public hospitalisation
is free. Those with PHI commonly pay a copayment.
(There is a perverse equity in these two anomalous out-
comes. The wealthy are paid to take PHI but financially
penalised if they use it!)
Third, lifetime community rating also involves a leap of
faith. The 30 year old must believe that public policy will
remain stable for 50 years – a belief that should have been
challenged when both parties announced changes in the
2004 election campaign. However lifetime community
rating also has a bizarre dimension. Insurance is generally
purchased to reduce risk and uncertainty. In the health
sector these arise because of the risk and uncertainty of ill
health and the cost of medical care. Prior to lifetime com-
munity rating this uncertainty depended upon possible
events in the following 1–3 years. After the change it
depended upon the next 1–30 years. Events in 30 years are
more uncertain than events in 3 years and, consequently,
the legislation increased risk and uncertainty. The per-
ceived risk was amplified by the publicly financed market-
ing of private insurance. Predictably, people responded to
the increased uncertainty by buying more insurance.
Thus, to encourage the uptake of insurance the govern-
ment increased the very thing insurance is designed to
reduce, viz, risk and uncertainty.
A final anomaly which predates the recent PHI reforms is
that private health insurance in Australia leaves the con-
sumer with residual risk. Particularly for ancillary services,
most benefits are capped and out of pocket expenditures
rise with the price of the service. This pattern of benefits is
exactly the opposite of the structure of benefits which will
maximise the patient's 'expected utility' [11].
Taken together, the changes introduced since July 1997
have created an extraordinarily complex and perverse set
of incentives. The ethical basis of the free market and the
liberal-libertarian model is that choices should be deter-
mined by individual's preferences in relation to real
(opportunity) costs. The surcharge subverts this process
and coerces choice and the strength of the coercion is
based upon economic class. There is no justification for
this in the economic theory of the efficient market.
Despite this conclusion, it is a legitimate function of gov-
ernment to determine the balance between public and pri-
vate delivery financing and the distribution of health care
costs. As described earlier the preference for private sector
funding and provision (albeit in the context of compul-
sory core insurance) is consistent with a legitimate and
defensible world view, viz, the liberal-libertarian belief
that in a free society individuals should be encouraged to
take responsibility for their own lives. In particular, the 30
percent subsidy is the orthodox approach to encouraging
an industry which has a special claim for protection and,
private health insurance does not compete on a 'level
playing field': it competes with a public sector which is
free at the point of service.
There are, however, two important caveats. First, and as
noted above, the measures taken have destroyed any
nexus between potential benefits and the price paid by
wealthy individuals. Secondly, the 'product' is unlike
usual insurance where the benefit – a payment after an
adverse event – does not impinge upon other individuals.
PHI is purchased to avoid queues and to select the best
possible doctor. With fixed capacity, the avoidance of
queues by one person imposes a longer queue on another
person – there is a 'negative externality'. Selection of the
best doctor reduces the access to these doctors by public
patients. Consequently, the important debate should be
about the 'right' to purchase preferential care at the expense
of those who do not have PHI. In a liberal democracy there
is a presumption that individuals may spend their own
income as they wish. For the individual there is probably
no more important context for exercising this 'right' than
in the context of preserving life and its quality.
There is, therefore, a head-on-head conflict between the
liberal-libertarian 'right' of the individual to spend his or
her income on health care and the communitarian-soli-
darity based 'right' of each individual in a community to
have equal access to high quality medical care. The latter
goal must necessarily be achieved by imposing some con-
straint upon income-based preferential care to a particular
group in the community. In Australia the constraint has
been a de facto financial penalty for seeking priority care.
Until the advent of engineering of negative prices for the
wealthy, the purchase and use of PHI resulted in 'double
payment' for some services, first via taxation and the
Medicare Levy and secondly by premium paid for PHI.
This 'penalty' still exists for lower income individuals and
households.
Conclusion 9:The public debate over Private Health Insurance
has been misleading. The contentious issues do not only concernAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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the most effective way of ensuring access to health care (with
the erroneous presumption that public monies not spent on
health services represents wasted resources). Rather, the con-
tentious issues include the 'right' or otherwise of the individual
to spend their own income on whatever they wish without coer-
cive financial penalties and the consequences for the remainder
of the community when one group jumps the queue and has pri-
ority access to the most experienced doctors.
Distributional effects of recent policies
PHI policy has been consistent with the other policies dis-
cussed above in one important respect. The policies are
likely to have a relatively small effect upon the delivery of
health services. Rather, they are about financing care and
the public-private balance in the health system. The bal-
ance, in turn, affects the distribution of health care costs
between different households. Copayments shift costs
from the government to patients. As government pay-
ments are met by progressive taxation, copayments redis-
tribute the cost of health care from wealthy-healthy
taxpayers to the less healthy, less wealthy. Additionally, as
copayments have a disproportionate effect upon the use
of services by low income households, the proportion of
the government subsidy returned to high income house-
holds rises as copayments rise.
The redistributive effects of PHI are more complex. Low
income households which purchase PHI unambiguously
pay more for hospital and health services. Their taxes and
the Medicare surcharge are unchanged and the purchase
of PHI leaves them out of pocket. For higher income
households, which are liable for the PHI surcharge, the
effects are conceptually ambiguous as they depend upon
the assumption made about the surcharge in a counterfac-
tual world in which PHI did not result in a surcharge
exemption. The surcharge was created specifically to per-
mit an exemption for those who purchased PHI and the
removal of the exemption might therefore be accompa-
nied by the removal of the surcharge.
Finally, and as noted earlier, the proposed changes to bulk
billing represent a structural change which will facilitate
the transfer of medical insurance costs from the public to
the private sector.
Conclusion 10:Recent and foreshadowed legislative policy ini-
tiatives with respect to bulk billing, copayments and PHI, all
concern the financing of health services. Recent policy has been
introduced with measures to mitigate the impact upon the most
needy and, in the case of medical rebates, in a way which
accommodates the popularity of bulk billing. Nevertheless, a
common feature is that each of the proposed or implemented
policies assists with the creation of a structure which facilitates
the transfer of expenditure from the public to the private sector.
If this occurs, it will reduce the cross subsidy from healthy
wealthy to unhealthy less wealthy households. This effect occurs
immediately with copayments. The transfers are more complex
in the case of PHI.
4 Five major problem areas
The five issues below have two common elements. First,
they are directly concerned with health services and not
the distribution of costs and incomes. Second, they have
been almost ignored in the public policy debate despite
being problem areas where there are quantitatively large
inefficiencies and a corresponding potential to increase
health outcomes and/or increase the overall cost effective-
ness of the system.
Efficacy, effectiveness and social objectives
In common with all other health systems many, and prob-
ably most, of the services provided in Australia have not
been adequately evaluated and there is no ongoing proc-
ess for the elimination of cost ineffective services. In 1987
Chassin et al [12] estimated that between one third and
one half of coronary services in his study were 'inappro-
priate' in the sense that they had no beneficial, or a detri-
mental affect upon health. An additional one third to one
half of the procedures considered had equivocal benefits.
Likewise, Brook [13] estimated that 51 percent of angiog-
raphy and 42 percent of coronary artery bypass graft pro-
cedures were unnecessary. Other studies by the US Health
Care Financing Agency and the OECD have likewise con-
cluded that only a small number of services have been
evaluated for efficacy [14]. In Australia Segal [15] demon-
strated that in the context of diabetes the cost of obtaining
a life year varied from $70,000 (drug therapy) to $2,400
for behavioural programs. Comprehensive diabetes care
was estimated to have a negative cost per life year; ie the
program saved life and saved cost.
With respect to this issue, the Australian record is compar-
atively good. It has led the world with the introduction of
mandatory economic evaluations for the drugs and serv-
ices to be subsidised through the PBS and the Medical
Benefits Scheme respectively. However the failure of other
countries does not indicate that Australian procedures are
satisfactory. The overwhelming majority of the services
which were accepted before the introduction of manda-
tory economic evaluations have not been assessed and,
with the passage of time, there is a need for the reassess-
ment of services and drugs.
A related problem is that drugs or services which are effi-
cacious when used appropriately in a random control trial
may be used inefficiently with inappropriate patients who
do not have the clinical indications of the patients in the
trial. Gold standard medical care requires that cost
effective therapy, drawing upon evidence-based medicine,
should be the norm and not the exception in medicalAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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practice. Cost effectiveness should be determined by a
broad ranging comparison of options form across the full
range of potential interventions; that is, comparator inter-
ventions should take account of substitute services from
across the entire health sector. This does not presently
occur. Guidelines for the PBS require a comparison
between drugs and exclude comparison with lifestyle/
behaviour change programs.
Conclusion 11:The scale of present evaluation activities is
inadequate. In an industry absorbing 9 percent of the GDP –
the country's largest industry – there should be ongoing and
large scale evaluation and re-evaluation of the cost effectiveness
of the services provided. Evaluation should be based upon a
comparison with the full spectrum of substitute services. A fail-
ure to do this almost certainly ensures that there will be wide-
spread and significant allocative inefficiency in the level and
mix of services.
Implementation of evidence based practice will inevitably
be resisted by service providers whose practice and
income may be adversely affected. Consequently, pro-
vider education for a 'culture change' is likely to be a slow
and ineffective vehicle for change. In contrast, once the
desired practice pattern has been determined, financial
incentives to encourage this form of practice may be
implemented relatively quickly and do not involve direct
coercion. The economics literature is replete with exam-
ples where such incentives have significantly altered pro-
vider behaviour [16-19]. Australian examples include the
use of GP incentives to bulk bill; to undertake rural prac-
tice and to increase child immunisation. DRG based
financial incentives were spectacularly successful in
increasing hospital throughput in Victoria in the early
1990s [20].
Conclusion 12:Reimbursement formula for service provision
should include financial incentives at all levels of service deliv-
ery for the use of the most cost effective therapies.
The more general principle which should, but does not,
permeate the market for health services is that the willing-
ness to pay for services should vary with social objectives,
a principle which is successfully incorporated in simple
competitive markets when social and individual objec-
tives are identical. As one example where this principle
has recently and successfully been used, if society wishes
to encourage bulk billing (which clearly benefits patients
but lessens provider control over their incomes) then the
benefit for services that are bulk billed should be
increased relative to the rebate for other services and the
differential increased until the target of bulk billing is
achieved. Likewise, if society wishes providers to adopt
evidence based medicine, hospitals to install clinical path-
ways, some procedures to be encouraged and others dis-
couraged, then payment for the desired service or process
should be increased relative to the reward when these
services or activities do not occur.
At the level of the individual service, recent research has
demonstrated health-related social objectives which are
often broader than the minimisation of morbidity and
mortality, for example, preferential treatment for particu-
lar age groups, particular classes of patients and health
benefits [21,22]. Presently these additional 'social prefer-
ences' are ignored. This is unsurprising as the research to
identify and measure them is still underway. However,
where these preferences are significant and consistent,
payments should eventually be adjusted to ensure that
they are achieved.
Conclusion 13:The payment of service providers should incor-
porate the principle that society should pay for what it wishes to
have in accordance with its social objectives, rather than what
it is given. This implies the need for ongoing enquiry into health
related social objectives (the numerous objectives loosely
grouped under the heading of 'equity').
Practice variations
In 1982 John Deeble and I used data from the first full
year of compulsory health insurance, (Medibank), to
determine the level of service use in each of Australia's sta-
tistical divisions [23]. An example of the results is shown
in Table 2. Huge variations in service use were detected
even between the relatively large geographical units used
in the study. Within these units small area variation
would have further increased the discrepancies. These dif-
ferences do not appear to have diminished with time.
Thus, for example, Robertson and Richardson [24] found
startling variation in the use of well-defined hospital pro-
cedures even after standardisation for age, sex and popu-
lation. In this study data were collected for a two year
period for each of Victoria's statistical sub-divisions. Pro-
cedural rates were expressed as a percentage of the rates
which would be expected from the State average service
use per age-sex cohort and from the demographic charac-
teristic of the Statistical sub-division (SSD). Results are
summarised in Figure 1. The bar, lines and circles give an
indication of the frequency distribution of the procedure
utilisation rates (ie the 25 and 75th percentiles (bars), two
standard deviations (lines) and outlying SSDs).
The results reveal an 8 to 10 fold variation in service use.
Part of this is attributable to the random variation that
would be expected because of the uncertainty of the epi-
sodes of ill health. Using state-wide data the ratio of actual
to expected variance was calculated. This is reported in the
column of numbers to the left of the bar diagram. For the
first procedure, coronary angiography, the observed vari-
ance was 13.4 times greater than expected; ie actual vari-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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ance was 1,440 percent of the expectation. This
extraordinary result is reproduced for all of the procedures
examined.
A second example of uneven service delivery was also pub-
lished by the same authors. This related to the likelihood
of obtaining a high tech procedure – angiography or
revascularisation – after a heart attack. Results shown in
Table 3 indicate that in the 14 days following the heart
attack, men and women admitted to a private hospital
were 2.2 and 2.27 times more likely to receive angiogra-
phy than their counterparts at a public hospital. They were
3.43 and 3.86 times more likely, respectively, to undergo
revascularisation (coronary artery bypass surgery angi-
oplasty, stent). These discrepancies did not diminish sig-
nificantly in the following 12 months. The same study
identified statistically significant differences in the likeli-
hood of a procedure between men and women, young
and old, urban and rural populations.
Taken together these studies suggest that there is a highly
erratic pattern of service delivery across Australia and
between social groups. One of three conclusions is inevi-
table. Some groups are under-serviced; some groups are
over-serviced or both of these problems occur to different
sub-groups of the population. This indicates both alloca-
tive inefficiency (more health could be obtained with a
redistribution of existing resources) and significant
inequity for those with poor access to health services or a
different form of inequity for those persuaded to undergo
Table 2: Practice Variations 1976
Consultations per capita
Statistical Division GP/(GP) Q(Spec) Total
Sydney 5.1 2.3 7.4
Tasmania 3.1 1.3 4.4
Darwin 1.1 0.5 1.6
Sydney/Darwin 4.6 4.6 4.6
Standardised Rate Ratios for Various Operations in the Statistical Local Areas in Victoria, Compared to the Rate Ratios for All  Victoria, Source: Richardson 1999 p198 Figure 1
Standardised Rate Ratios for Various Operations in the Statistical Local Areas in Victoria, Compared to the Rate Ratios for All 
Victoria, Source: Richardson 1999 p198.
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procedures where risks exceed likely medical benefits.
Government has shown almost no interest in this type of
result. There has been recognition of an 'urban-rural' dis-
crepancy but, 20 years after the demonstration of a more
complex pattern than a simple urban-rural dichotomy,
remarkably little has been achieved.
Conclusion 14:Significant variation in the use of services has
been allowed to continue more than two decades after it was
identified. Small area variation across Australia almost cer-
tainly reflects significant allocative inefficiency and an inequi-
table access to health services. There appears to have been
relatively little interest in this problem.
Lack of coordination
The health system at present consists of a series of finan-
cially independent programs ('silos'), which are poorly
linked to other health services or programs. There appears
to be near universal agreement that a sensible health
scheme cannot be built upon the current Federal-State
division of financing, responsibilities and powers or upon
the existing Commonwealth program structure. In the
context of a recent review of hospital care, the Tasmanian
Government accepted a recommendation for the pooling
of all health and aged care resources [25]. However imple-
mentation of the recommendation requires Common-
wealth support which may or may not be forthcoming.
The fact that a simple solution exists for this most elemen-
tary problem but, to date, has not been seriously
addressed, represents a fundamental failure of govern-
ment in Australia.
Two case studies are used below to illustrate what gold
standard allocative efficiency would imply for the use and
coordination of services. They indicate the distance that
health services reform must travel in Australia before we
have gold standard delivery.
The first case study is real. A Seattle-based 'pure' Managed
Care company, Ethix, was asked to establish a health
scheme for a small town close to Seattle. Routine surveil-
lance of the medical claims over the first two years of the
new scheme highlighted an anomaly. There were exces-
sively large numbers of youths receiving surgery for spinal
injuries. Further investigation found that the problem was
attributable to a toboggan run on the outskirts of the town
which had a tree stump half way down the slope. Youths
were crashing into the stump and damaging their spine.
The health scheme paid for a bulldozer to remove the
stump [26].
Medicare does not pay for bulldozer services. However, in
the circumstances described here it should do so. More
generally, the vignette illustrates two of the characteristics
of gold standard delivery, namely, routine data surveil-
lance to locate problems with any aspect of social or med-
ical behaviour which might be modified to improve
health and, secondly, the flexibility of funding which is
needed to adopt the most cost effective solution to the
identified problems. In contrast, in the Australian health
scheme a problem of this sort would not be detected by
the health system. It is possible that a similar type of acci-
dent could fall under the jurisdiction of an occupational
health and safety or traffic accident authority. Otherwise
there would be neither the will nor the means to respond.
If such a problem was eventually identified the typical
response would be accusation, blame shifting and, possi-
bly, litigation. The cause of this problem is related to the
practice of Management by Objectives, an aspect of man-
agerialism, which encourages local rather than system-
wide thinking. Interestingly, Peter Drucker, one of the
early advocates of MBO, in recent years has publishes
warnings about its over-use and limitations.
Conclusion 15:A key challenge is to establish a single payer
(for each person) with flexibility and incentives to purchase the
most cost effective services. Services should not be determined
by historical program boundaries and rigid budgets. There has
been a serious failure by government to address this fundamen-
tal issue. The achievement of this relatively simple reform is
necessary (but not sufficient) for the achievement of a range of
system reforms.
The second case study is a hypothetical scenario con-
structed by Duckett to illustrate gold standard system
coordination and processes [27].
'A woman with dizziness is concerned about her health.
She rings the State call centre which advises her to visit her
local health team. She is able to see the GP quickly who asks
her a series of questions from the relevant research based
protocol and undertakes a clinical examination. The GP
emails the results to a local specialist... who orders some
further investigations consistent with the state research
based care path... Advice of (an) impending admission is
automatically conveyed electronically to the GP and the social
Table 3: Ratio: (Likelihood of procedure after admission to a 
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worker in the referring health team. The social worker con-
tacts the hospital to discuss discharge planning... The
specialist... suggest(s) a number of sources for information
about the patient's condition. The patient contacts the call cen-
tre for further information... The case is randomly selected by
the hospital audit committee for quality review. The commit-
tee suggests some slight changes to the state-wide protocol
committee.' p204.
The key elements of this scenario relate to information
access and transferral. It illustrates the role of evidence
based medicine, routine service review, the adaptation of
protocols, universal electronic transfer of all information
and the absence of incentives to depart from best practice.
Parts of this scenario correspond with Australian practice.
But the events in italics would be unusual. It appears to be
serendipitous whether a particular problem of a particular
person and in a particular part of Australia results in a
response which even partially mirrors the gold standard
response in this scenario.
Conclusion 16:Commonwealth and State authorities should
mandate practices which improve the coordination of services.
To facilitate this there should be universal use of electronic data
systems for patient notes and information transfer. Evidence
based protocols and clinical paths should be adopted when
available and relevant. Feedback and error learning should be
a routine part of the system. All of these desirable features are
presently difficult because of the fragmentation of the system
which is, in part, attributable to the failure to establish a single
funder for all health services received by an individual.
Quality of care
Results from the 1995 'Quality in Australian Health Care
Study' (QAHCS) suggest that the quality of health care in
Australia is a problem which overshadows all others. In
the initial study, reported by Wilson et al [28] medical
records for more than 40,000 admissions to 28 hospitals
in NSW and SA were individually examined to determine
whether or not an adverse event (AE) was associated with
the admission (prior to or during the episode of hospital-
isation). A judgement was made concerning the conse-
quences of the AE and whether or not it might have been
avoided.
By extrapolating results the authors estimated that about
470,000 admissions were associated annually with an AE
and that these would have resulted in 18,000 deaths and
50,000 cases of permanent disability. In a subsequent
report Runciman et al [29] estimated that in 50 percent of
the AEs in the QAHCS had a high preventability score.
Sixty percent of deaths could have been avoided. In this
latter study, incidence and not prevalence scores were
reported as part of the effort to standardise the methodol-
ogy with an earlier Harvard Medical Practice Study
(HMPS) reported by Brennen et al [30]. This reduced the
annual rate of AEs to 10.6 percent of admissions.
From the response to these events (discussed below) it
appears likely that many have been unable to appreciate
the scale of the carnage implied by the report. If the results
from the original QAHCS are not discounted then medi-
cal errors have been responsible for the death of more
Australians per annum than the average annual death rate
of Australian soldiers in World War 1 (15,800). Perma-
nent disabilities per annum approximate the annual rate
of casualties in The Great War (62,500). Unlike The Great
War, the problem of AEs has probably been ongoing for
50 years or more.
In Table 4 below the death rate from AEs is compared with
mortality rates from other causes which are of particular
social concern. To be conservative and to take account of
undetected bias, the AE rate reported in a 1995 study is
reduced by 50 percent. Preventable deaths are assumed to
be 50, not 60, percent of deaths associated with an AE. The
resulting, conservative number of deaths from AEs in
1999 were about 40 percent higher than the number of
deaths from AIDS, suicide, motor vehicle accident, acci-
dental falls, homicide, drowning and poisoning com-
bined. In Table 5 some equivalent events are listed. The
conservative estimate of the unnecessary death rate is
about the same as would occur if the Bali bombing
occurred every week of the year, year after year.
While those affected by adverse events will, on average, be
older and frailer than those who died in Bali or during
World War 1, the magnitude of the problem is still stag-
Table 4: Perspective: Selected Causes of death, 1999
Cause No of deaths
AIDS 122
Suicide (intentional self harm) 2,492




Poisoning by drugs/medications 1,015
Subtotal 6,468
All deaths from adverse events(1) 9,000
All preventable adverse 
events(2)
4,500
(1) 50 percent of reported 
estimate
(2) assuming 50 not 60 percent 
are preventableAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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gering. Considering the reaction to the Bali bombing it
might have been expected that the publication of the
QAHCS would have caused a seismic shock, with the pub-
lic demanding immediate, comprehensive reform and
government passing urgent legislation to mandate any
achievable system reform which ameliorated the prob-
lem. If the system failures which preceded the Bali bomb-
ing warrant a Parliamentary inquiry, equivalent interest
might have been expected with respect to a problem
responsible for an equivalent number of deaths every
week. An effectively unlimited budget might have been
approved for the upgrading of quality and safety.
In contrast, the actual reaction to the report must consti-
tute one of the more puzzling episodes of Australia's
social history. At all levels the response was sedate, cau-
tious and incremental and there appears to have been
greater concern that our health system might be perceived
as unsafe than with the fact that it actually is unsafe. The
level of activity in the 5 years following publication of
QAHCS suggests that the results may not have been truly
believed. But no subsequent study was funded to validate
or refute the results.
The QAHCS results were not ignored. As summarised in
Table 6 an advisory body was immediately established
which evolved into the Australian Council for Safety and
Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC). Its activities are sum-
marised in five successive annual reports. In addition, the
Australian Health Care agreement between the Common-
wealth and State governments allocated budgets of $680
million and $785 million for quality assurance activities
for the periods 1998–2003 and 2003–2008. In each of the
States sub-committees and working groups were created
which, along with the ACSQHC have resulted in a very
large number of reports, publications, some legislation
and local initiatives. The ACSQHC alone lists 35 publica-
tions [31]. State activities are summarised in ACSQHC,
[32]. These initiatives have resulted, inter alia, in moves to
tighten up hospital accreditation processes; to monitor
adverse events more closely; to improve consumer partic-
ipation in the evaluation of health care; to encourage
health professionals to report adverse events; to improve
health information technology; to establish practice
guidelines, etc. The large number of funded projects are
described and listed in ACSQHC, [33].
Despite the high level of activity, the importance, priority
and sense of urgency reflected appear more appropriate
for an (important) ongoing reform process in an already
well-operating system. There is a yawning gulf between
this and what the public would undoubtedly demand if
our TV and news services were reporting deaths on the
scale of the September 11 New York disaster very two
months accompanied by about three times this number of
injuries. The philosophy of the reform process appears to
be summarised by the ACSQHC when it approvingly
quotes Berwick as saying that 'there are no quick fixes. We
must re-examine all that we do', p14 [31].
As a description of history the 'no quick fixes' statement is
correct. The 1999 report – 4 years after the publication of
the QAHCS recommended that 'actions identified by the
taskforce... need to be implemented at all levels of the
health system'. By 2001 NSW had passed legislation
which, inter alia, created the Institute of Clinical Excel-
lence. By 2002 – 6 years after publication – the Victorian
Quality Council Plan had been established. In 2003 the
updated version of this plan set as its goals, inter alia, the
establishment of a framework, the involvement of con-
sumers and education. Almost 10 years after the report,
the ACSQHC called for mandatory participation of all
hospitals in a process of assessment [31] and (with possi-
ble irony or ill concealed frustration) the Chairman of the
ACSQHC argues in the 2004 Annual Report that 'Action
must be taken without untimely delay where culpability is
clear', p5 [34].
Between publication of the QAHCS and the Health Min-
isters' request for a report in 1995, 13,500 Australian
would have died and 37,500 become permanently disa-
bled. By the time the 1999 report was recommending the
implementation of various policies at least 18,000 would
Table 5: Events equivalent to avoidable AE deaths*
Cause
1 in 10 customers in restaurants poisoned each year: annual deaths 
4,500
13 Jumbo jets crash each year, each with 350 Australian passengers 
killed
45 Bali bombing type attacks, each with 100 Australians killed each 
year
'September 11' every 8 months: only Australians die
*assuming preventable deaths = 25% QAHCS (1995)
Table 6: Response to QAHCS
1995 QAHCS published
1996 Taskforce established on QAHC
1998 Health ministers ask Advisory Group for report
1998 Interim Report
1999 Report of the National Expert Group
'Actions identified by the taskforce... need to be 
implemented at all levels of the health system ...'
1999 Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care 
EstablishedAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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have died. By the time of the NSW legislation cumulative
national deaths would have reached 27,000. The Victo-
rian Strategic Plan to develop a framework was published
after the death of at least 31,500.
It is scarcely surprising that in 1999 an editorial in the
Medical Journal of Australia commented that:
'Welcome though (various initiatives) are, the pace of
change nevertheless seems slow given the stark message of
the original QAHCS study four years ago... 50,000 Austral-
ians suffer permanent disability and 18,000 die at least in
part as a result of their health care', p404–50 [35].
By 2002 Siddons could still comment that:
'On the 10th anniversary of the study year, the most strik-
ing outcome has been the paucity of reform currently
exhibited at the coalface of tertiary health care', p823 [36].
The inadequacy of the response is surprising as the evi-
dence suggests that a reduction in AEs would be spectacu-
larly cost effective. The interim report from the national
expert group estimated the potential savings from pre-
ventable adverse events in 1995/96 would be $4.17 bil-
lion  per annum. Consequently, expenditures of this
amount could be justified if they eliminated the unneces-
sary AEs or if the cost of the achievable 50 percent reduc-
tion in AEs was less than $2 billion per annum.
In contrast with the view that little could be done quickly
there are a number of examples where, prima facie, very
significant and effective change could have been/can be
rapidly implemented. The chief distinguishing feature of
each of the suggestions below is that they involve legisla-
tion and regulatory enforcement which appears to be
inconsistent with the apparent emphasis upon persuasion
and voluntary culture change in many of the present activ-
ities. Mandated options include the suggestions below.
AccreditationFor decades health professionals have
believed that a significant number of small hospitals are
dangerous. However there has been no decisive action.
With full knowledge of the QAHCS results, hospital
accreditation remains voluntary in all States except Victo-
ria. There will clearly be self-selection. Low quality hospi-
tals will opt not to seek accreditation and poorly qualified
doctors will seek out these hospitals. Universal accredita-
tion could be mandated. Multiple accreditation teams
could have the power to randomly inspect hospitals or
units within hospitals and close those judged to be dan-
gerous – as occurs with restaurants with sub-standard
hygiene. It is unclear whether or not present accreditation
is sufficiently rigorous to reduce avoidable adverse events
significantly. There appears little reason why the accredi-
tation process should not itself be reviewed to ensure that
credentialed hospitals satisfy rigorous safety standards in
their facilities and procedures.
Doctor AccreditationPatterns of private practice patterns
are already subject to scrutiny in Australia. But the chief
purpose is to detect medical fraud. Legislation could
require the examination of practices to detect those which
deviate significantly from evidence based guidelines con-
structed by the relevant Royal Colleges. When there is a
known relationship between the small number of proce-
dures carried out by a doctor and negative outcomes, as
occurs with surgery, critical annual procedure rates may be
established which trigger the provision of information to
the doctor, the mandatory review of the practice and
finally the dis-accreditation of the doctor for the conduct
of these procedures. While it is true that some doctors take
on the hard cases partial standardisation for case complex-
ity is possible and this problem would obviously be taken
into account by those conducting the review. The appro-
priate systems could be established in 1 to 2 years.
Mandatory Disclosure and Error LearningIt is not compul-
sory for hospitals or doctors to register AE and routinely
provide feedback to facilitate error learning. This means
that the most important vehicle for improving quality and
reducing patient risk is not compulsory. The opportunity
for error leaning is almost certainly under-utilised in a
large number of hospitals and probably ignored by the
doctors whose performance most needs monitoring. Leg-
islation might ensure the universality of this critical sys-
tem reform. The adverse events register could and should
be linked to doctors and appropriate threshold levels
installed which sequentially trigger information feedback,
review, and finally dis-accreditation of the doctor. It is
likely that the first of these steps will be sufficient to effect
satisfactory change. Despite this, 9 years after publication
of the QAHCS the chairman of the ASCQHC notes that
'we have insufficient accurate data for fully appreciating
the current size of the multiple causes of this problem ...
we need the data from multiple sources, including inci-
dent monitoring systems, routine administration data
sources and the use of screening tools to practically iden-
tify areas that may cause harm.' (p5) [34].
Protection from litigationThe published research on 'high
reliability organizations' suggests that it is wise to separate
inquisitorial from punishment processes, such as dis-
accreditation. Adverse events are unlikely to be reported if
there is a financial incentive to hide the AE. For this reason
legislative protection of doctors from the financial out-
come of litigation is probably a prerequisite for a success-
ful and comprehensive system of error learning. The
consequences for a doctor associated with AE should be
based upon medical criteria and uncoupled from theAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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social mechanism for compensating patients. Legal pro-
tection alone is unlikely to improve the quality of the
information used for error learning. Rather, it should be
part of a package of requirements which includes penal-
ties for the failure to report an AE.
Information transferPatient notes are still transferred
within hospitals using 19th Century clipboards. It is
known that this commonly causes potentially lethal
errors. The mandated use of (long available) electronic
forms of transmission could alert staff to the risk of inap-
propriate procedures, the administration of conflicting
drugs or the failure to administer a drug. Likewise X-ray
films are often misplaced or lost. The consequences may
be lethal. Legislation could ensure the use of digital tech-
nology to ensure immediate access of results. New wire-
less technologies make it possible for roving staff –
doctors and other professionals – to have constant access
to text and basic technical data. As with electronic note
taking this might take 1 to 2 years to fully install in all Aus-
tralian hospitals, clinics and nursing homes.
Hospital systemsHospital systems in Australia are com-
monly ramshackle or antique. There are no required path-
ways or mandatory discharge criteria. There are no
internal or external financial incentives for the optimal
treatment of patients. These changes are more complex
but could be installed comfortably in 4–6 years.
Conclusion 17:There is no reason why much of the health sys-
tem should have missed the IT revolution which has trans-
formed other parts of the community. In relation to the size of
the AE problem, the cost of implementing late 20th Century
information technology throughout the health system is likely to
be small relative to the human and financial cost of AEs
averted.
Minimum staffing requirementsThere is no regulation
which links on site expertise and the complexity or riski-
ness of the procedures which may be undertaken in a hos-
pital. For example, it is possible for a hospital to permit
significant surgery but have no on-site medical practi-
tioner post-operatively. This potentially lethal practice
could be proscribed and minimum staffing ratios imple-
mented within the 1–2 weeks needed to reschedule staff
or the location of procedures. It was not until 2003 that
the ACSQHC released a paper considering issues of staff
rostering, skill mix, staff numbers, staff supervision and
team functioning [33]. While endorsing the AMA (volun-
tary) code of practice, [37] it comments – almost 8 years
after the QAHCS – that 'responsibility for improving the
management of staffing variables cannot (ie should not
but still is being) left to individuals. It is a governance
responsibility...' pii (words in brackets added)] [38].
QueuingThe airline industry operates a highly efficient
computerised system of booking and queuing which may
be accessed by travel agents throughout the world. By this
standard most hospital queuing systems – if they exist –
are rudimentary. It is possible and desirable for different
hospitals in the public hospital system to be intercon-
nected to provide patients or their doctors with available
times for treatment city, state or nation-wide. Queuing
and scheduling can and should be operated using publicly
known criteria. In the USA there is a nation-wide system
for matching patients with available organs. (There is,
interestingly a prioritisation criterion which, for reasons
of equity, assigns compatible organs on the basis of need,
not prognosis.) Australia has no such system.
Conclusion 18:Queuing should be regulated by a nation-wide
prioritising system based upon explicit criteria. This would
increase efficiency and, for the patient, increase choice and
certainty.
The private sector would have greater difficulty in operat-
ing such a system because of the patient's attachment to a
particular doctor. Private health insurance organisations
could, however, offer a similar service to patients who are
willing to accept treatment from contracted providers.
Australia's technologically conservative PHI organisations
appear uninterested in these initiatives.
Information and system auditThe suggestions above and,
to date, the majority of the reforms contemplated in
reports, represent process measures of success. However,
their objective is to reduce adverse errors and for this rea-
son, record analysis of the form conducted by the QAHCS
should be an ongoing feature of the system. The QAHCS
research was relatively expensive, but these costs are infin-
itesimal in relation to the importance of the surveillance,
the costs, the morbidity and deaths averted.
Conclusion 19:A policy of persuasion and culture change is an
insufficient response to a problem of the magnitude of the AE
epidemic. As a matter of highest priority, legislation should be
passed requiring extensive system regulation and reform to
reduce the incidence of adverse events. The required changes
should be fully funded (or they will not occur) and should
include the use of state of the art IT, minimum staffing
requirements and system feedback on both individual hospital
and individual doctor performance. Evaluation and random
audit of all hospitals and health care providers and the report-
ing of all AEs should be mandatory. Doctors should be given
comprehensive protection against the results of successful litiga-
tion. The review of doctor performance should be uncoupled
from compensation for the patient.
Public informationThere is no legitimate reason for infor-
mation relating to hospitals and individual doctors to beAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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withheld from the public. There is a persuasive argument
that the public has a right to such information. Addition-
ally public awareness and the likely response from the
public to such information are likely to accelerate the pace
of reform. There are persuasive reasons for providing
information more generally concerning the performance
of all parts of the system, including individual care provid-
ers. Patient choice in the absence of information is a cha-
rade. Failure to forewarn patients that the hospital of their
(doctors') choice has a substandard safety record and that
capacity exists in hospitals with a better record could, and
arguably should, be regarded as professional negligence.
There can be little doubt that, if consulted, the public
would overwhelmingly endorse the need for this informa-
tion. More generally, the provision of information is an
effective method for effecting change and it is unlikely
that the pace of reform would have been as sedate if the
public were properly aware of the safety record of various
health care providers.
One argument against this option is that the provision of
information might result in a loss of confidence in hospi-
tals and doctors. However, the argument that the public
should be kept in ignorance to engender unjustified con-
fidence is, at best, dubious and if this ignorance allows an
inadequate policy response then it is additionally harm-
ful. In some states of the USA, and most notably New
York, severity adjusted mortality rates are available for
every hospital and for every doctor. This has not resulted
in a significant change in the pattern for public demand
but it has galvanised doctors and hospital staff to success-
fully review and upgrade their procedures [12]. League
tables have recently been introduced in England to allow
doctors and patients to evaluate the performance of par-
ticular hospitals [39]. From late 2004 the performance of
individual surgeons will probably be available [40].
Conclusion 20:Information is a key element in achieving sys-
tem reform and for the efficient operation of all markets, private
or public. All institutions and individuals should receive rapid
feedback on their performance. Information should be routinely
collected and also obtained from random audit of hospitals. In
particular, information should be publicly available with
respect to the safety record of hospitals and providers of medical
care.
Financial incentivesAs discussed earlier, financial incen-
tives are one some of the most effective, non-coercive
ways of achieving desired outcomes. There has been very
limited use of this powerful instrument and the financing
of medical services has generally been perceived as a
reward for providers doing what they select to do rather
than as an opportunity for influencing what is done. This
is an important missed opportunity. Importantly, finan-
cial incentives are non-coercive and avoid the head-to-
head conflict between 'clinical autonomy' and the
'patient's right to evidence based medicine' which may
accompany direct regulation.
Conclusion 21:Financial incentives should be used flexibly
throughout the health system to induce behaviour which mini-
mise AEs.
Governance and ownership of the problemA key theme of
this paper has been that government policy has focused
almost exclusively upon financial issues and that there has
been little concern from within the legislature with health
services and health. This is possibly the root cause of the
government failure. Activities from within the various
bureaucracies have largely been bureaucratic. In its 2004
review of State initiatives the ACSQHC reports that
Queensland now has 'a program to develop a workforce
culture that values a multi-disciplinary evidence based
approach to improvement'; in 2003 the NT implemented
an 'overarching quality committee'; NSW had 'involved
the appointment of patient safety managers'. The ACT
now has a framework which 'provides explicit lines of
accountably'; Victoria now 'has a policy of an open and
transparent approach to the provision of information' etc
(p8) [34]. There is no reference to national legislative
action to enforce safety.
The ACSQHC itself appears frustrated with the scale of the
national effort when it comments that 'over the last year
with public failures reported in some Australian hospitals
it is clear that a small program of national investment and
development needs to be matched by the will, skill and
capacity of stakeholders....' (p5). On the same page it
comments that 'Council is actively working to further
develop data sources, but cannot do so without continued
support by all governments' (p5). Almost 10 years after
the 1995 report the ACSQHC comments that 'future work
... needs to consider what governance and responsibilities
are required at all levels of the health care system to ensure
the provision of safe health care' (p84).
Conclusion 22:Despite the unnecessary death of between
40,000 and 80,000 Australians since the publication of the
QAHCS, Australian government has not taken ownership of
the problem of adverse events. As a result, those attempting to
effect change have been forced to 'coax and cajole' Options to
'mandate and enforce' have been largely ignored.
Disregard of evidence
The last conclusion relates to the need to generate and dis-
seminate information relating to system safety. The argu-
ments for this apply more generally to health system data.
Australia has a wealth of administrative databases which
could be employed to investigate and improve system per-
formance. As noted earlier, service use is very unevenAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
Page 17 of 19
(page number not for citation purposes)
across Australia. To the extent that this violates the usual
notion of 'equity' this information should be an impor-
tant input into policy formulation. It does not appear to
be used for this purpose outside NSW. However the qual-
ity of the data also presents other opportunities. The effect
of different treatments, such as the varying rates of angiog-
raphy and revascularisation observed between public and
private hospitals could be traced through time if record
linkage were possible. This would allow an assessment of
downstream costs, mortality and morbidity associated
with the two patient groups. There are clearly many
opportunities for longitudinal research of this sort. A fur-
ther option which may be piggy-backed on administrative
data is the routine provision of information to different
groups of patients who have been identified by their serv-
ice mix. Information of this sort is probably a highly effec-
tive way of 'empowering patients'; that is, enabling
patients, and particularly those with a chronic disease, to
take greater control of their disease management.
These developments have not occurred for a variety of rea-
sons. First, for an $80,000 million industry, research fund-
ing for 'product development and marketing' – health
services research – is astonishingly small. In the USA six
Federal agencies alone spent $US 1,658 million in 2002
upon HSR. The agencies and their expenditures are
detailed in Table 7. Significant US funding is also
obtained form the US network of Foundations which does
not exist in Australia. Benchmarking against the Federal
agencies alone, at an exchange rate of $US 0.70 = $AUS
1.0 (0.65) and scaling these expenditures down in rela-
tion to the size of the US and Australian economies, Aus-
tralia should be spending about $AUS 120 million on
HSR. Australia does not currently spend a fraction of this
amount. As a major initiative, the NHMRC is to provide
$10 million per annum for HSR – or about 7.7 percent of
the US Federal benchmark.
A second and possibly related reason is that there is no
dedicated instrumentality, similar to the AIHW, which has
taken 'ownership' of the need to provide and periodically
to review the need for information generated by HSR.
Funding is currently inadequate but also ad hoc.
Third, concern over the confidentiality of records has been
elevated to such a level that easy and routine data linkage
to observe the outcome of different service patterns does
not seem to be a possibility. For example, access to Aus-
tralia-wide, de-identified public hospital records requires
the separate consent of all States and Territories as well as
the cooperation of the Commonwealth Department of
Health or AIHW. Data linkage to determine the conse-
quences of different treatment patterns – who lives and
who dies – is so difficult that the research is effectively
proscribed.
It is extremely doubtful that this concern in the bureauc-
racy over privacy would reflect the preferences of a well-
informed population. Patients almost certainly suffer and
die because of the interpretation and implementation of
our confidentiality laws in a way which seriously inhibits
the capacity of the public, researchers and private and
public agencies to investigate the outcome of system
performance and differences in individual treatments. The
bureaucratic fetish with confidentiality does not occur in
the USA where the risk of litigation is significantly greater
than in Australia. In some states data relating to hospital
and doctor mortality rates are regularly published and in
California unit record hospital data is available on CD in
university libraries.
Conclusion 23:Routinely collected administrative data should
be fully used to monitor system performance. In particular it
should be employed to monitor equity of access to services regu-
larly and to provide disease-related information to population
groups identified as having particular needs and interests. A
statutorily independent national institute for health services
research should be established whose terms of reference require
the achievement of these objectives.
5 Discussion and conclusion
There are various options for the macro reform of the
health system and the corresponding reform of financial
incentives and the roles and responsibilities of the various
players. In particular, Dick Scotton has cogently argued
for the adoption of Managed Competition [41-43]. A par-
tial movement in this direction could be achieved by
transferring responsibility for the purchase of health serv-
ices to the various health regions [44]. There has been no
attempt to review this large topic here. Rather, the paper
has reviewed the 'micro' elements of such reform. The
most appropriate 'macro' model for the health system is
the model which maximises the likelihood of implement-
ing satisfactory solutions to the numerous problems fac-
ing the system including those that have been discussed
above.
Table 7: US expenditure upon Health Services Research
Federal Agency Expenditure 
($US millions)
Agency for Health Care Research and Quality 300
National Centers for Health Statistics 127
Extra Mural Prevention Research CDC 18
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 55
Veteran's Health Administration 371
National Institute of Health 787
Source: Annual reportsAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:1 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/1
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The chief conclusion from this paper is that the 'health
care debate' and recent policy 'reform' has focussed upon
issues which are best described as 'very small order' as
judged by their likely effect upon either health or the cost
effectiveness of the health system. They have been prima-
rily concerned with dollars, not health and, more specifi-
cally, with the distribution of the cost between the public
and private sectors.
None of the policies discussed in Section 3 of the paper is
likely to increase cost effectiveness. Cost shifting from the
PBS to the public creates differential copayments which
encourages allocative inefficiency. PHI reforms have cre-
ated an industry with bizarre financial incentives and is a
spectacular example of negative micro economic reform.
The common feature of the three policies is that each
moves the health system in a direction which is more con-
sistent with the liberal/libertarian world view in which
responsibility is transferred to the individual and away
from the community. While PHI helps the individual to
avoid financial decisions at the point of service, the indi-
vidual is responsible for the purchase of the insurance and
for the payment of (net) premiums. Copayments are the
most direct method for shifting responsibility to the indi-
vidual users of health services. Bulk billing for pensioners/
health care card holders preserves the safety net which is
needed for the achievement of equity as commonly
defined by this world view. Over the longer term the pur-
suit of these values would redistribute income to the
healthy, wealthy and away from the unhealthy unwealthy
which is the antithesis of the communitarian/solidarity
value system. The vehicle for the transfer is both a decline
in community financed expenditures and a corresponding
decline in taxation.
As discussed in Section 2, decision making with respect to
social objectives is the legitimate role of government.
However, good economic and social policy seeks to
achieve these objectives in a way that is cost effective. The
reforms discussed here have not achieved this.
In contrast with these policies, the five neglected areas dis-
cussed in Section 4 deal with problems which are 'large
order issues' as judged by their likely impact upon health
and the cost effectiveness of the health system. Also con-
trasting with the first group, these issues are relatively
'value neutral' as judged by either the communitarian or
libertarian perspectives. The failure to address satisfacto-
rily these issues is attributable to neglect, not the domi-
nance of a particular ideology. This failure over a very long
period itself refects a failure in the governance structure
and a failure to identify and act upon opportunities for
quantitatively large system improvements. The failure is
probably replicated in most other developed countries,
reflecting the complexity of the health sector. But bench-
marking against similarly impaired systems does not alter
the fact that there are opportunities for significantly
improving the community's health which have been
largely ignored. The reasons why this has occurred has not
been discussed here and, to a greater or lesser extent, these
failures have probably been replicated in most other
developed countries, reflecting similar social and techni-
cal histories.
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